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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1969 Stonewall Riots, June has been revered as a month of
revolution for LGBTQ*2 rights.3 In 2000, President Bill Clinton officially
declared June as Gay and Lesbian Pride Month, and, in 2011, President
Barack Obama expanded the observance of pride to include transgender
and bisexual identities.4 June’s spark struck again when the Supreme Court
upheld same-sex couples’ right to marriage in their 2015 Obergefell v.
Hodges decision.5 June was recently an important time for the LGBTQ*
community in 2020. On June 15 of that year, the Supreme Court decided
Bostock v. Clayton County,6 which asked whether Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)7 prohibited employment discrimination
based on one’s sexual orientation and/or gender identity.8 In a 6-3 opinion,
the Court said yes.9
Upon hearing the Bostock decision, the LGBTQ* community audibly
sighed in relief. Decades of fighting to express their sexual orientation and

2. LGBTQ* here means “lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer,” with “queer”
used as an umbrella term to describe the limitless identities that exist outside of rigid
categories of gender and sexual orientation. The asterisk encompasses any identities not
listed.
3. See Jenna Marina Lee, Why Do We Celebrate Pride Month in June and LGBT
History Month in October?, UCFTODAY (June 1, 2021), https://www.ucf.edu/news/why-dowe-celebrate-pride-month-in-june-and-lgbt-history-month-in-october/
[https://perma.cc/8YBZ-MPR8].
4. See id.
5. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
6. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
7. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
8. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
9. See id. at 1746 (“[T]here is no way an employer can discriminate against those who
check the homosexual or transgender box without discriminating in part because of an
applicant’s sex.”).

2022]

THE RAINBOW CONNECTION

917

gender identity in the workplace without fear had finally culminated in
Bostock.10 Duke Law Professor Trina Jones succinctly described the
decision’s impact: “The decision increases the possibility that the more
than 8 million members of the LGBT[Q*] community will be treated with
the dignity and respect that people deserve in every aspect of life, and
especially when they are simply trying to earn a living.”11 Nevertheless, a
question lingered in the silence that followed: was this really the end of
employment discrimination for the LGBTQ* community?
Title VII forbids employers from discriminating against employees “on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”12 Despite Title
VII’s prohibition on discrimination based on “sex,” until Bostock, courts
had not yet consistently expanded “sex” to include LBGTQ* status as a
protected class. In fact, until Bostock, even the Court’s most expansive
readings of “sex” never explicitly included transgender and gender nonconforming people.13 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) had evolved in its own interpretations, expanding Title VII to
apply to gender identity in Macy v. Department of Justice14 and further
extending it to sexual orientation in 2015 in Baldwin v. Department of
Transportation.15 However, the circuit courts were split on whether sexual
orientation and gender identity fell into discrimination because of sex.16
Bostock affirmed the EEOC’s and certain circuits’ expansion of Title VII,
finally settling this long-standing disagreement.

10. See Jason Baumann, Susan Dillon & Douglas Dillon, The Long History of LGBTQ
Employment Rights Activism, N.Y. PUB. LIBR. (June 18, 2020), https://www.nypl.org
/blog/2020/06/18/supreme-court-ruling-lgbtq-employment-rights [https://perma.cc/5MLVTRPY].
11. Duke Law Faculty React to Landmark Supreme Court Decision in Bostock v.
Clayton County, Ga, DUKE L. NEWS (June 17, 2020), https://law.duke.edu/news/duke-lawfaculty-react-landmark-supreme-court-decision-bostock-v-clayton-county-ga/
[https://perma.cc/W4A4-XP6V].
12. See Civil Rights Act § 7.
13. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (finding that
refusal to promote a cisgender lesbian woman because she did not present femininely
enough constituted sex-based stereotyping prohibited under Title VII).
14. No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012).
15. No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015).
16. See J. Dalton Courson, Circuit Split on Interpretations of Title VII and SexualOrientation-Based Claims, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.american
bar.org/groups/litigation/committees/civil-rights/practice/2018/circuits-split-oninterpretations-of-title-vii-and-sexual-orientation-based-claims/ [https://perma.cc/7L2U-PE4
K]. It is important to note the difference between gender and sex. While sex relates to the
biological differences between male and female bodies, gender is more complex and
includes personal expression and perceptions and societal attitudes and expectations. See
generally Jennifer Tseng, Sex, Gender, and Why the Differences Matter, 10 AMA J. ETHICS
427 (2008).
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Bostock and its consolidated cases were considered mixed-motive cases
— as are most employment discrimination cases.17 These cases involve
evidence that the employer may have had both lawful and discriminatory
reasons for taking a particular adverse employment action. Courts’
standard for evaluating mixed-motive cases has evolved alongside their
understanding of how workplace discrimination manifests. The modern
standard for evaluating such cases comes from the 1991 Civil Rights Act’s
(1991 CRA)18 § 2000e-2(m) provision, which holds that an employee must
show that her protected identity was a “motivating factor” for an
employer’s adverse employment decision.19
Even with this more lenient standard, employment discrimination
plaintiffs face steep hurdles in getting their cases past a defendant’s motion
to dismiss. This Note argues that the two major obstacles in succeeding
past the summary judgment stage are the misplaced application of the more
onerous McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green20 standard at summary
judgment and the courts’ resistance to consider implicit bias when
evaluating plaintiffs’ claims and employers’ same action defense. These
obstacles are particularly damaging for LGBTQ* workers who have
achieved surface-level societal acceptance but still regularly combat
employers’ and decisionmakers’ lingering implicit biases.21
When
someone is LGBTQ* and employed at will, they are more at risk of facing
such implicit biases while having little chance for remedy. 22 In response,
this Note suggests (1) that the 2000e-2(m) standard should be the only one

17. See Maya R. Warrier, Note, Dare to Step Out of the Fogg: Single-Motive Versus
Mixed-Motive Analysis in Title VII Employment Discrimination Cases, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REV. 409, 424 (2008) (“[M]ixed motives are unusually prevalent in employment decisionmaking because (1) biased decision-making based on social-category information can occur
without the decision maker’s awareness and (2) people are experts in masking behavior that
is often questionable or negatively viewed by society.” (citing Michael I. Norton et al.,
Mixed Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of Legitimate and Illegitimate Criteria on
Decision Making, 12 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 36, 39 (2006))).
18. Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
20. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
21. See infra Section II.C.
22. See infra Section II.B & II.C. Unlike with employees with just cause protections,
“employers can fire at-will employees for ‘good cause, for no cause, or even for cause
morally wrong.’ An at-will employee can be discharged for a single mistake, an argument
with a supervisor, an unintentional violation, off-duty conduct, or even for reasons that are
patently false.” Robert M. Schwartz, Using ‘Just Cause’ to Defend Against Unfair
Discipline, LABORNOTES (Jan. 15, 2019), https://labornotes.org/2019/01/using-just-causedefend-against-unfair-discipline
[https://perma.cc/2PNS-8NXE].
Employment-at-will
protects inconsistent terminations and discipline, which can make it harder to establish what
is an arbitrary termination and what is a discriminatory termination only thought to be
arbitrary.
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offered at summary judgment for mixed-motive cases and (2) that courts
include implicit bias evidence in their evaluation of mixed-motive
discrimination cases.
Part I of this Note gives an overview of the concepts necessary for
understanding its proposals. It first examines the employment-at-will
doctrine and the evolution of the mixed-motive burden of proof through
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,23 the 1991 CRA, and Desert Palace Inc. v.
Costa.24 From this, it will discuss the ongoing debate amongst circuit
courts on what is the proper standard for evaluating summary judgment
motions for mixed-motive employment discrimination cases. Part II then
discusses potential reasons why the 1991 CRA mixed-motive standard has
not “revolutionized” employment discrimination law as some scholars
expected.25 It suggests that the current CRA standard is ill-suited to
address the newly recognized forms of discrimination caused by implicit
bias and that circuits’ continuing use of the McDonnell Douglas standard
for mixed-motive cases is similarly improper. Part II further explains how
these inadequate standards particularly affect LGBTQ* plaintiffs who are
superficially accepted by society but still deal with implicit anti-LGBTQ*
bias, even from truly pro-LGBTQ* employers. Part III will discuss
previously offered solutions to this problem and examine how and why
they fail to adequately resolve it. Lastly, Part IV will propose that, moving
forward, courts should abandon the McDonnell Douglas analysis in mixedmotive cases and instead include implicit bias analysis when reviewing
employees’ prima facie mixed-motive claims and employers’ affirmative
defenses.
I. HISTORY
A. Employment-at-Will
Initially adopted from English law, employment-at-will’s (EAW) U.S.
counterpart began to diverge from its European origins in the nineteenth
century.26 The modern U.S. idea of termination at-will allows for an
employer to terminate an at-will employee at any time for any reason (or
for no reason) — except for independently unlawful grounds — without

23. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1075, as recognized in, Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1017 (2020).
24. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
25. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Making Too Much of Too Little?: Why “Motivating
Factor” Liability Did Not Revolutionize Title VII, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 357 (2020).
26. See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118, 118 (1976).
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incurring legal liability.27 Likewise, an employee may leave an at-will job
at any time for any or no reason without adverse legal consequences.28 All
U.S. states (excluding Montana) are at will,29 meaning that employees
across the nation — including major cities like New York, Los Angeles,
Chicago, Miami, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Austin, and Houston — are
subject to EAW’s unpredictable nature.30
The creation and expansion of antidiscrimination law have been the most
restrictive exception to an employer’s ability to hire, fire, promote, and
make other employment decisions. After all, EAW does not allow for
unlawful terminations, including terminations considered discriminatory
under Title VII.31 In theory, Bostock’s expansion of Title VII means that
an employer cannot fire, deny promotions to, or terminate an employee
because of his or her sexual orientation and gender identity. However, this
Note will demonstrate this protection may be weaker in practice than it is
on paper.
B. The Development of the Mixed-Motive Burden of Proof
i. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
Under Title VII, there are two theories of employer motive for adverse
employment actions: single and mixed. The single-motive theory
developed from the U.S. Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of Title
VII’s “because of” language.32 To the Court, “because of” meant that a
single discriminatory reason motived the adverse employment action.33
The standard for evaluating such cases comes from the Supreme Court’s

27. See At-Will-Employment — Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 15,
2008), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.
aspx [https://perma.cc/BZC6-S7S4].
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. The U.S. Census Bureau measures urban areas as having at least 2,500 people. See
Michael Ratcliffe, How Do We Measure Urban Areas?, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 4,
2012), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-samplings/2012/04/how-do-we-me
asure-urban-areas.html [https://perma.cc/2DMZ-YUC9]. Each of these cities meets that
criterion.
31. See At-Will-Employment Overview, supra note 27.
32. See Kaitlin Picco, The Mixed Motive Mess: Defining and Applying a Mixed-Motive
Framework, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 461, 462 (2011) (explaining that this “because of”
language means adverse employment actions made “because of” one of Title VII’s protected
classes).
33. See id. An example of single-motive discrimination is an employer failing to
promote an employee because of an attribute or feature that makes them a member of a
protected class (e.g., their race) despite the employee qualifying for the promotion.
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decision in McDonnell Douglas.34 Under this standard, the plaintiff must
first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.35 The burden then shifts
to the employer, who must articulate a legitimate and nondiscriminatory
reason for their adverse employment action.36 Lastly, if the employer is
successful in articulating this reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff,
who — to avoid losing her case — must demonstrate that the employer’s
reasoning is pretextual for discrimination.37
However, the Supreme Court reconsidered its narrow understanding of
Title VII’s “because of” language in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.38 The
case centered on Ann Hopkins, a senior manager at Price Waterhouse who
was proposed as a candidate for partnership.39 Despite partners in
Hopkins’s office praising her character and accomplishments,40 some found
her aggressive personality grating, describing her as “macho” and needing
“a course at charm school.”41 The nail in the proverbial sexist coffin was
when the head partner at the Washington office, Thomas Beyer, advised
Hopkins to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”42 In
response to what she believed to be sex-based discrimination, Hopkins filed
a Title VII claim in D.C. District Court.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held in favor of
Hopkins.43 However, the two courts could not agree on whether an
employer was relieved of liability if it proved it would have made the same
decision regardless of its discriminatory motive.44 Price Waterhouse, the
losing party at both the district and circuit courts, appealed to the Supreme
Court.45

34. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
35. See id. at 802.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 804.
38. See generally 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
39. See id. at 233.
40. See id. at 234.
41. See id. at 235.
42. Id.
43. See generally Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d,
490 U.S. 228 (1989); Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
44. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237 (“The Court of Appeals . . . held that even if
a plaintiff proves that discrimination played a role in an employment decision, the defendant
will not be found liable if it proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have
made the same decision in the absence of discrimination . . . . [W]hereas under the District
Court’s approach, the employer’s proof in that respect only avoids equitable relief.”).
45. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 485 U.S. 933 (1988).
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Even among the Justices, there was disagreement about how to
determine employer liability.46 This disagreement led to a four-justice
plurality and two concurring opinions.47 The plurality opinion, written by
Justice Brennan, held “because of” does not mean “solely because of[;]”48
an employer considering illegitimate and legitimate factors when making
an employment decision is acting “because of” both factors.49 Therefore, a
mixed-motive plaintiff could establish that her employer’s adverse
employment decision was discriminatory if she could prove that her
protected status “play[ed] a motivating part in [the] employment
decision.”50 If the plaintiff met this initial burden, the employer could only
avoid liability if it could prove that “even if it had not taken [the protected
factor] into account, it would have come to the same decision.”51 To do so,
the employer must provide objective evidence that the same decision would
have been justified — not that the employer merely would have made the
same decision absent the discriminatory motive.52 Following the D.C.
Circuit’s rationale, Justice Brennan’s opinion held that if the employer
proved this “same-decision” defense, it could not be liable under Title
VII.53
However, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence stated that only “direct
evidence” would shift the burden from the plaintiff to the defendant.54
Direct evidence is evidence that demonstrates discriminatory intent without
presumption or inference;55 conversely, circumstantial evidence is evidence
requiring presumption or inference, such as “statistics demonstrating a
clear pattern of discriminatory effect.”56 Therefore, Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence meant that an employee could only prevail on a mixed-motive
action by presenting evidence explicitly showing discriminatory intent in

46. Compare Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 253–54 (plurality opinion), with id. at 259–
61 (White, J., concurring), and id. at 279 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
47. See Paul W. Mollica, What’s on the Secret Title VII Menu?: Proving “Motivating
Factor” and “Same Action” Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 35 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 53,
59 (2020).
48. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (emphasis added).
49. See id.
50. See Mollica, supra note 47 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252).
51. See id. (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252).
52. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252.
53. See id. at 242.
54. See id. at 275 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
55. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 6 (2021) (citing Coghlan v. Am.
Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005)), https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/T6
Manual6 [https://perma.cc/QQS2-ZRGT].
56. Id.
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relation to the adverse employment action. Despite not being binding,57
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence was “treated as the operative holding of
the Court,”58 with lower courts requiring plaintiffs to present direct
evidence of a discriminatory motive.59
ii. The 1991 Civil Rights Act
Price Waterhouse was quickly criticized for being too pro-employer;
Justice Brennan’s majority allowed discriminatory employers to evade
liability, while Justice O’Connor’s concurrence unfairly increased a
plaintiff’s initial burden.60 However, just two years after the decision,
Congress enacted the 1991 CRA.61 According to Section 3(4) of the 1991
Amendments, one of Congress’s purposes in drafting the CRA was to
prevent Price Waterhouse from jeopardizing the fundamental principle of
Title VII: allowing victims of proven discrimination to obtain relief and
perpetrators of discrimination to be held liable for their actions.62
To do so, the 1991 CRA overrode parts of the decision, rejecting the
lower courts’ adherence to Justice O’Connor’s direct evidence requirement
and the meaning of Justice Brennan’s “same decision” defense.63
Congress’s more pro-plaintiff approach, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(m), required that a plaintiff only prove that a protected class was a
motivating factor in an adverse employment decision.64 Under this new
standard, a plaintiff established a mixed-motive discrimination claim under

57. See Concurring Opinion, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu
/wex/concurring_opinion [https://perma.cc/J3HG-SFG9] (last visited Mar. 3, 2022).
58. Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate Treatment
Law: McDonnell Douglas’s Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 511,
532 (2008).
59. See Mollica, supra note 47, at 55.
60. See id. at 60 n.44 (“If an employer can escape liability by pointing generally to
perceived problems with an employee’s interpersonal skills, subtle but pervasive forms of
discrimination will remain unchecked by [T]itle VII.” (quoting citing The Supreme Court,
1988 Term — Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 350 (1989))); see also Susan Struth,
Note, Permissible Sexual Stereotyping Versus Impermissible Sexual Stereotyping: A Theory
of Causation, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 679, 696 (1989) (regarding the decision as “unjust to
the plaintiff to permit an employer to absolve itself completely of liability after the plaintiff
has already proven that the employer relied significantly on illegitimate considerations in
reaching the employment decision”).
61. Compare Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), with Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
62. See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers:
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 548–49
(2009) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 120-40, pt. 1, at 47 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
549, 585).
63. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

924

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIX

Title VII if he or she demonstrated that “race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice.”65
This lower burden on the plaintiff was paired with an affirmative
remedial defense for the defendant. Similar to Justice Brennan’s approach,
Congress allowed an employer to assert a “same action” defense under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).66 However, Congress liberalized Brennan’s
approach by still holding an employer who met this defense liable under
Title VII.67 But, in such a case, a plaintiff cannot get damages or
reinstatement; he or she may only receive declaratory or injunctive relief
and attorneys’ fees.68
iii. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa
Despite the 1991 CRA implicitly relaxing the plaintiff’s evidentiary
burden, its exclusion of Justice O’Connor’s direct evidence requirement
resulted in a circuit split with the main question being whether the 1991
CRA entirely superseded Price Waterhouse’s causation standard for Title
VII discrimination cases.69 Some courts continued requiring mixed-motive
plaintiffs to produce direct evidence and differed on what constituted as
such.70 In 2003, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa helped to further override the direct evidence requirement and
advocated instead for Congress’s motivating factor standard.71
In the majority opinion, written by Justice Thomas, the Court affirmed
the lower court’s holding that a plaintiff did not require direct evidence to
obtain a mixed-motive instruction under 2000e-2(m). 72 Instead, the Court
held that demonstrating a motivating factor under Title VII required
“meet[ing] the burdens of production and persuasion.”73 The Court even
held that circumstantial evidence is “not only sufficient, but may also be
more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.”74 Despite
this overt endorsement of the 1991 CRA, the McDonnell Douglas pretext
65. Id.
66. See id. § 2000e-5.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra
Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 886 (2012). The 1991 CRA never
explicitly mentioned this standard. See id.
70. See id.; see also Mollica, supra note 47, at 55.
71. See generally 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
72. See id. at 101.
73. Mollica, supra note 47, at 62 (quoting Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 99).
74. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100 (citing Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500,
508 n.17 (1957)).
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method remains the default standard for mixed-motive Title VII
discrimination cases.75
C. Bostock’s Effect on Title VII
Seventeen years after Desert Palace, the Supreme Court decided
Bostock v. Clayton County.76 Prior to Bostock, research showed a dramatic
shift in U.S. residents’ views of LGBTQ* rights.77 From 1973 through
1991, there was little change in public attitudes towards the LGBTQ*, with
most viewing homosexuality as being “always wrong.”78 In fact, until the
1990s and 2000s, many people in the United States limited their perception
of LGBTQ* issues to a binary sphere of gay men and lesbian women;
issues pertaining to the transgender community were considered separate
from their gay and lesbian counterparts.79 However, after 1991, there were
many rapid changes in LGBTQ* support. For example, support for samesex marriage went from 11% approval in 1988 to 46% in 2010.80 In 2019,
62% of U.S. residents said they have become more supportive of
transgender rights in the last five years.81
Yet, despite this growing acceptance of LGBTQ* people, circuits were
split on whether “sex” in Title VII extended to sexual orientation and
gender identity.82 Some believed that sexual orientation and gender
identity were intrinsically related to the “sex stereotype” standard
announced in Price Waterhouse and revisited in Desert Palace.83 As stated
by the Court in Price Waterhouse, acting on beliefs about how women and
men should act inherently involves acting on the basis of gender.84

75. See Mollica, supra note 47, at 63–64.
76. See 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
77. See TOM W. SMITH, NORC, UNIV. OF CHIC., PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS
HOMOSEXUALITY 1 (2011).
78. See id.
79. See Erin Blakemore, From LGBT to LGBTQIA+: The Evolving Recognition of
Identity, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 19, 2021), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history
/article/from-lgbt-to-lgbtqia-the-evolving-recognition-of-identity [https://perma.cc/JSX7-Q5
GZ].
80. See SMITH, supra note 77, at 1.
81. See Mark Mellman, Mellman: Changing Views of Transgender Rights, HILL (June 9,
2019, 7:30 PM) (citing PUB. RELIGION RSCH. INST., AMERICA’S GROWING SUPPORT FOR
TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 7 (2019)), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/448047-mellmanchanging-views-of-transgender-rights [https://perma.cc/S5AC-MC5X].
82. See Courson, supra note 16.
83. See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 2017) (en
banc).
84. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
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The Seventh Circuit’s Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of
Indiana85 decision expanded this “sex stereotype” rationale to prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation. This case focused on Kimberly
Hively — an openly lesbian, part-time, adjunct professor at an Indiana
community college — who was continually not selected for a full-time
position with the college.86 In response, she filed a Title VII sex-based
discrimination claim against her employer. The Seventh Circuit found for
Hively under two theories.87 First, under the “comparative method,”88
Hively’s status as a lesbian represented a failure to conform to the female
stereotype because she is attracted to other women, not men.89 Second,
under the “associational theory,”90 the Circuit found that, just as
discrimination against a member of an interracial couple implicated
discrimination based on race, discrimination against gays and lesbians
implicated discrimination based on sex.91
It is important to note how essential Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc.92 was to Judge Wood’s reasoning in Hively. Coming a decade
before the Seventh Circuit decision, Oncale recognized that same-sex
sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII’s “because of . . . sex”
prohibition.93 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, made it clear that,
while same-sex harassment was not “the principal evil Congress was
concerned with when it enacted Title VII, . . . statutory prohibitions often
go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils.”94
Hively’s majority expanded upon this new ground of “reasonably

85. See 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); see also Courson, supra note 16.
86. Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
87. See id. at 345 (“Hively offers two approaches in support of her contention that ‘sex
discrimination’ includes discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation . . . . Although the
analysis differs somewhat, both avenues end up in the same place: sex discrimination.”).
88. The comparative method is when the court “attempt[s] to isolate the significance of
the plaintiff’s sex to the employer’s decision” and asks whether, “holding all other things
constant and changing only . . . sex,” would the plaintiff have been treated the same way?
See id. at 345.
89. See id.
90. The associational theory posits that one “who is discriminated against because of the
protected characteristic of one with whom she associates is actually being disadvantaged
because of her own traits.” Id. at 347. The Circuit elaborates on the evolution of this theory
through the development of what constituted race discrimination. See id. at 347–49.
However, the Circuit applies the theory to other Title VII protected classes as well, stating
that changing the sex of one partner in a lesbian relationship would make a difference in
analyzing a sex-based discrimination claim just as changing the race of one partner in an
interracial marriage would. See id. at 349.
91. See Courson, supra note 16; see also Hively, 853 F.3d at 347–49.
92. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
93. See id. at 82.
94. Id. at 79.
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comparable evils” in holding sexual orientation discrimination actionable
under Title VII.95
Contrary to the Hively decision, the Eleventh Circuit held in Evans v.
Georgia Regional Hospital96 that discrimination based on sexual
orientation was not actionable under Title VII;97 however, discrimination
based on “gender nonconformity” was.98 The surprisingly blunt majority
opinion denied the plaintiff’s argument that she had faced workplace
discrimination because of her sexual orientation.99
The Supreme Court’s Bostock decision came only three years after the
Evans decision.100 It consisted of three consolidated cases from three
different circuits: the Eleventh, the Second, and the Sixth.101 The Eleventh
Circuit case focused on Gerald Bostock — the titular petitioner in this
long-overdue case.102 In 2003, Bostock worked as a child welfare services
coordinator in Atlanta, Georgia.103 In January 2013, Bostock became
involved in a gay recreational softball league.104 This involvement had
influential members of the community upset.105 When his employer
discovered this, he fired Bostock for conduct “unbecoming” of a county
employee.106 Prior to his termination, Bostock was considered a model
employee with high-scoring performance evaluations.107 After Bostock
sued for sex discrimination under Title VII, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated
its position in Evans and held that the statute did not prohibit employers

95. Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
96. 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017).
97. See id. at 1255.
98. See id. at 1254.
99. See id. at 1255.
100. See id.; see also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
101. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1734.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1737.
104. See id.; see also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., No. 1:16-CV-001460-ODE-WEJ, 2016
WL 9753356, *1 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2016).
105. See Bostock, 2016 WL 9753356, at *1–2. According to Bostock, months after
joining the league, his participation in the league and his sexual orientation and identity
were openly criticized by one or more persons who had a significant influence on his
employer’s decision making. See id. These persons were not identified in any decision.
Bostock also alleged that, during a May 2013 meeting with the Friends of Clayton County
CASA Advisory board, where his supervisor was present, at least one individual made
disparaging comments about Mr. Bostock’s sexual orientation and identity and participation
in the softball league. See id. The individual was not identified in any decision. See id. at *2.
106. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
107. See Bostock, 2016 WL 9753356, at *1.
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from firing employees for being gay.108 Bostock filed a petition for a writ
of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.
The Second Circuit case was initiated by Donald Zarda.109 In the
summer of 2010, Zarda, a gay man, worked as a sky-driving instructor at
Altitude Express.110 As part of his job, Zarda regularly worked in close
physical proximity to clients.111 Both Zarda and his co-workers routinely
referenced sexual orientation around clients, and Zarda sometimes told
female clients his sexual orientation to assuage their concerns regarding
being strapped to a man for a tandem skydive.112 Altitude Express fired
Zarda days after he mentioned being gay to one of his clients.113 Like
Bostock, Zarda filed suit under Title VII in the Second Circuit alleging sex
discrimination.114 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Second Circuit held for
Zarda, concluding that sexual orientation discrimination does constitute sex
discrimination under Title VII.115
The Sixth Circuit case was initiated by Aimee Stephens, who worked at
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes in Garden City, Michigan.116 When
she got the job, Stephens presented as a male. But two years into her
service with the company, clinicians diagnosed her with gender dysphoria
and recommended that she begin living as a woman.117 In her sixth year at
the funeral home, Ms. Stephens wrote a letter to her employer explaining
that she planned to “live and work full-time as a woman” after returning
from an upcoming vacation.118 The funeral home fired her, stating that
“this is not going to work out.”119 The Sixth Circuit reached a similar

108. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738; see also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs,
723 F. App’x 964, 965 (11th Cir. 2018), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton
Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
109. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1734. See generally Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883
F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
110. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738; see also Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108.
111. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108.
112. See id.
113. See id.; see also Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1734.
114. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738; see also Zarda, 883 F.3d at 107.
115. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738; see also Zarda, 883 F.3d at 132. Unfortunately,
during the proceedings, Zarda passed away. However, his estate continued to press his
causes for the benefit of his heirs. However, as this Note will demonstrate, the fact that these
cases made it to trial at all is itself a victory. See infra Section II.D.
116. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1734.
117. See id. at 1738.
118. See id.
119. See id.
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decision to the Second Circuit’s, holding that Title VII bars employers
from firing employees because of their transgender status.120
D. The Current State of Mixed-Motive Antidiscrimination Law
Bostock is an unusual employment discrimination case in that it survived
until trial. Ever since the Court’s ruling in Circuit City Stores v. Adams,121
which permitted pre-hire employment agreements, most employment
discrimination cases never reach litigation.122 To be hired, many modern
employees must agree to forego all rights to lawsuits and instead
arbitrate.123 This style of alternate dispute resolution is known as
mandatory arbitration and bars access to the courts for all types of legal
claims, including Title VII discrimination claims.124 In 2018, over 55% of
workers were subject to mandatory arbitration, meaning that 60.1 million
American workers had no court access and instead had to arbitrate their
employment disputes, including discrimination.125
Of the few employment discrimination cases that do make it to litigation,
most are decided at summary judgment.126 When the court grants an
employer’s motion for summary judgment, it decides that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact pertaining to the allegedly
discriminatory decision.127 Granting this motion also ends the plaintiff’s
employment discrimination claim.128 Despite the seemingly settled Title
VII mixed-motive standard used at trial, circuits are split on how to
evaluate these cases at the summary judgment stage.129 The Supreme

120. See id.; see also Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 600 (6th Cir. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). Like Zarda, Stephens passed during the course of the proceedings,
but her estate continued her claim for the benefit of her heirs.
121. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
122. Only 6% of all employment discrimination cases ever make it to trial. See Ellen
Berrey, Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, A Quantitative Analysis of Employment
Civil Rights Litigation, in RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW
PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 54, 63 (2017).
123. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in
Employment, 35 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 76 (2014).
124. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECON.
POL’Y INST. (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mand
atory-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/5QG2-2B4H].
125. See id.
126. See Christopher J. Emden, Note, Subverting Rule 56? McDonnell Douglas, White v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., and the Mess of Summary Judgment in Mixed-Motive Cases, 1
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 139, 140 (2010).
127. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
128. See id.
129. See Sarah Keates, Note, Surviving Summary Judgment in Mixed-Motive Cases —
White v. Baxter Healthcare Corporation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 785, 790 (2009).
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Court’s ruling in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby likely contributed to the
split.130 In Anderson, the Court held that, when ruling on summary
judgment, a “judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of
the substantive evidentiary burden.”131 Therefore, at summary judgment,
trial courts determine not only if there is a factual dispute present but also if
the plaintiff has satisfied their evidentiary burden of proof.132
However, with the differing burdens elaborated in Price Waterhouse,
1991 CRA, and Desert Palace (and perhaps judicial stubbornness to
congressional override),133 lower courts clashed on what a mixed-motive
plaintiff’s burden was and what evidence satisfied it. Of this split, only the
Eighth Circuit has held that Desert Palace had no impact on prior Eighth
Circuit decisions.134 Therefore, the Circuit held in Griffith v. City of Des
Moines135 that a plaintiff with direct evidence of illegal discrimination
survived summary judgment.136 If the plaintiff has no direct evidence, she
must instead “creat[e] the requisite inference of unlawful discrimination
through the McDonnell Douglas analysis.”137
Instead of outright rejecting the 1991 CRA framework, the Fifth Circuit
created a modified mixed-motive analysis, merging both the McDonnell
Douglas’s and Desert Palace’s approaches.138 The case establishing this
merged analysis, Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc.,139 held that plaintiffs with
only circumstantial evidence of discrimination must proceed under the first
two steps in McDonnell Douglas. Supposing the plaintiff is successful, the
burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate reason for its
decision. The last step of the analysis allows plaintiffs to offer evidence
that the employer’s proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination (as
available under McDonnell Douglas) or only one of the reasons for its
conduct.140

130. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
131. Id. at 207.
132. See Emden, supra note 126, at 152 (quoting Leland Ware, Inferring Intent from
Proof of Pretext: Resolving the Summary Judgment Confusion in Employment
Discrimination Cases Alleging Disparate Treatment, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 37, 47
(2000)).
133. See Widiss, supra note 62, at 523 (“[Courts] often interpret an override as
establishing a narrow exception to a general rule and continue to rely upon the precedent
that was overridden.”).
134. See Keates, supra note 129, at 790.
135. 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004).
136. See Keates, supra note 129, at 790–91.
137. See id. (citing Griffith, 387 F.3d at 736).
138. See id. at 791–92.
139. 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004).
140. See id. at 312–13.
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Four out of the 13 circuits reject using only the McDonnell Douglas
standard.141 For the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, plaintiffs
may instead choose to establish their case under one of two standards.142
For the Fourth Circuit, a plaintiff can survive summary judgment either by
presenting direct or circumstantial evidence that “raises a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether an impermissible factor . . . motivated the
employer’s adverse employment decision”143 or by using the McDonnell
Douglas approach. The Seventh Circuit has a similar binary set-up, with
McDonnell Douglas used for the “indirect” method of proving mixedmotive discrimination and direct or circumstantial evidence used for the
“direct” method.144 The Ninth Circuit allows a similar choice; plaintiffs
may proceed under the McDonnell Douglas framework or “may simply
produce direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a
discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated [the employer].”145
The D.C. Circuit has an analogous two-option procedure.146
However, only two circuits have explicitly and totally rejected the
McDonnell Douglas standard: the Sixth and the Eleventh Circuit. In White
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,147 the Sixth Circuit decided that the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis was unnecessary for proving
mixed-motive claims and similarly did not apply to such claims at
summary judgment.148 Instead, the Sixth Circuit held a position consistent
with § 2000e-2(m)’s motivating factor standard.149

141. See Johanna T. Wise & Alexander Meier, Un-Mixing the Mixed-Motive Standard,
SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com/
2016/04/un-mixing-the-mixed-motive-standard/ [https://perma.cc/6UCK-792L]. The First
Circuit has declined to analyze the role of the McDonnell Douglas framework post-Desert
Palace, but “appears to have adopted a summary judgment approach similar to the Fourth,
Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits’ approaches.” Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814
F.3d 1227, 1239 n.8 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45 &
n.8 (1st Cir. 2009)).
142. See Keates, supra note 129, at 792.
143. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005).
144. See Hossack v. Floor Covering Assocs. of Joliet, Inc., 492 F.3d 853, 860–61 (7th
Cir. 2007).
145. Keates, supra note 129, at 792–93 (quoting McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d
1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004)).
146. See Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
147. 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008).
148. Id. at 398–400.
149. See Keates, supra note 129, at 795. The standard states that a plaintiff can defeat
summary judgment by “(1) establishing that the defendant took an adverse employment
action against the plaintiff and (2) by showing that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was ‘a motivating factor’ for the defendant’s adverse employment action.” See id.
(quoting White, 553 F.3d at 400).
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While the Eleventh Circuit initially agreed with the Eighth Circuit’s
application of the McDonnell Douglas, it more recently reversed this
opinion in Quigg v. Thomas County School District.150 Relying on the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in White, the Quigg Court reasoned that, to
properly evaluate such claims, it should “ask only whether a plaintiff
offered evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took
an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) [a protected
characteristic] was a motivating factor for the defendant’s adverse
employment action.”151 Overall, while Desert Palace was initially hailed
as McDonnell Douglas’s executioner,152 few circuits have truly shelved the
McDonnell Douglas standard in its entirety.
II. THE GAPS IN THE CURRENT MIXED-MOTIVE STANDARD
A. Implicit Bias and Modern-Day Discrimination
Despite the growing acceptance of 2000e-2(m)’s more lenient standard,
plaintiffs’ attorneys shy away from using the mixed-motive standard.153
This reluctance is due, in part, to 2000e-2(m)’s structure subjecting
attorneys’ clients to an employer’s remedy-limiting affirmative “sameaction” defense.154 Judge Mark W. Bennett has described the motivating
factor standard as a “Trojan horse” whose lower burden comes with the
real possibility that a successful plaintiff may walk away with no monetary
relief.155 Because of 2000e-2(m)’s affirmative defense, Judge Bennett
“doubts that many plaintiffs will be willing to run the risk of prevailing on
liability, but still receiving no monetary compensation for their efforts.”156
This conflict of choice should be less apparent at the summary judgment
stage since plaintiffs are not forced to make a final decision between the
McDonnell Douglas and 2000e-2(m) litigation structures; if a triable issue
exists under either standard, the motion should be denied.157 Despite this
alleged freedom, plaintiffs’ employment discrimination claims are still

150. 814 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016): see also Wise & Meier, supra note 141.
151. Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1239 (quoting White, 533 F.3d at 400).
152. See Emden, supra note 126, at 148 n.67 (“From what the Court said, it necessarily
follows that McDonnell Douglas is gone.” (quoting William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the
Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1549, 1562 (2005))).
153. See Mollica, supra note 47, at 63; see also Sullivan, supra note 25, at 396.
154. See Sullivan, supra note 25, at 397.
155. See id. at 397–98 (citing Coe v. N. Pipe Prods., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1097–98
(N.D. Iowa 2008)).
156. Id. at 397.
157. See id. at 396 n.164.

2022]

THE RAINBOW CONNECTION

933

routinely dismissed at summary judgment.158 This may be in part because
courts deciding employment law summary judgment motions often view
the evidence in a piecemeal manner and apply “formalistic rigidity to a
complex and elusive phenomenon like workplace discrimination.”159
Additionally, most discrimination cases no longer hinge on explicit
discrimination from employers.160 Instead, modern employers may now
act on unconscious biases, prompting adverse employment decisions they
believe to be nondiscriminatory but are actually based in prejudice. Justice
Ginsburg stated this phenomenon in simple yet eloquent terms: “Managers,
like all humankind, may be prey to biases of which they are unaware.”161
Therefore, judges’ piecemeal method of reviewing evidence may explain
why so many cases are dismissed at summary judgment; the wrongs Title
VII was enacted to combat have changed, and judges have not yet adapted
accordingly.
This form of unconscious bias, also known as implicit bias, causes
people to “act on the basis of prejudice and stereotypes without intending
to.”162 The application of implicit bias is not limited to the social
psychology sphere; many legal scholars have acknowledged how it might
affect the application of the law.163 Some scholars have tied implicit bias
to the theory of behavioral realism.164 In the context of antidiscrimination
law, behavioral realism proposes that judges “remain continuous with
progress in psychological science” and periodically revisit “judicial

158. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and
Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 709–10 (2007) (observing that 73% of
summary judgment motions in employment discrimination cases are granted and that nearly
all are in favor of defendants).
159. Kerri Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination Law, 56 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 111, 116–17 (2011) (quoting Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313,
329 (2010)).
160. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459–60 (2001).
161. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 372–73 (2011) (Ginsberg, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
162. Implicit Bias, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 31, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/implicit-bias/ [https://perma.cc/SCW6-HLQZ].
163. See generally Catherine Ross Dunham, Third Generation Discrimination: The
Ripple Effects of Gender Bias in the Workplace, 51 AKRON L. REV. 55 (2017); Annika L.
Jones, Comment, Implicit Bias as Social Framework Evidence in Employment
Discrimination, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1221 (2017).
164. Behavioral realism proposes that legal “theories should remain consistent with
advances in relevant fields of empirical inquiry,” including cognitive social psychology and
the related social sciences. See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral
Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1001 (2006).
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models . . . of what discrimination is, what causes it to occur, how it can be
prevented, and how its presence or absence can best be discerned.”165
With increasing awareness of implicit bias has come similar awareness
of discrimination’s complex and elusive nature. No longer do employers
discriminate with smoking gun statements like: “This is no job for a
woman” or “Irish need not apply.”166 Employers are aware that such
statements will almost always be understood as discriminatory under Title
VII,167 and many now have formal policies that prohibit discrimination and
set procedures to enforce those policies.168 Rather than coming from a
deliberate and overt bias, implicit bias causes employers to unconsciously
discriminate against their employees and potentially not even realize it.
Raiders’ coach Jon Gruden is a modern example of a potentially
unaware, discriminatory employer. In numerous emails during a sevenyear period starting in 2011, Gruden casually used homophobic slurs.169 In
these emails, he called the National Football League’s (NFL)
commissioner, Roger Goodell, the f-slur, which is derogatory against
LGBTQ* peoples, particularly gay men.170 Gruden also said that Goodell
should not have pressured Jeff Fisher — then coach of the Rams — to draft
“queers” in reference to the team choosing Michael Sam, a gay man, to
play for the team in 2014.171 In a statement issued on the Raiders’s
Twitter, Gruden said about the emails: “I’m sorry, I never meant to hurt
anyone.”172
For present purposes, the Note accepts Gruden’s belated apology at face
value without considering its pretext of discrimination. While Gruden’s
use of slurs is explicit bias,173 both the timing of his comments and his
professed ignorance about its effects suggests that his anti-LGBTQ* bias

165. Id.
166. See Sturm, supra note 160, at 460.
167. See id. at 466 (“By the passage of Title VII, many companies had eliminated explicit
policies of exclusion, but continued their exclusionary practices. These practices . . . were
often obvious and pervasive, and conformed to a well understood idea of discrimination.”).
168. See id. at 460.
169. See Ken Belson & Katherine Rosman, Raiders Coach Resigns After Homophobic
and Misogynistic Emails, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/
10/11/sports/football/what-did-jon-gruden-say.html [https://perma.cc/4VR7-SBYR].
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. Id. (quoting Las Vegas Raiders (@Raiders), TWITTER (Oct. 11, 2021, 10:03 PM),
https://twitter.com/Raiders/status/1447744629168693250 [https://perma.cc/VQ7S-5QAE]).
173. The use of slurs is a type of hate speech. See Mihaela Popa-Wyatt & Jeremy L.
Wyatt, Slurs, Roles and Power, 175 PHIL. STUDY 2879, 2880 (2018). Hate speech is
commonly regarded as an expression of explicit bias. See Explicit Bias, PERCEPTION INST.,
https://perception.org/research/explicit-bias/ [https://perma.cc/FA34-W4HB] (last visited
Mar. 3, 2022).
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was more akin to implicit bias than explicit. For example, during the time
of Gruden’s leaked emails, the term “gay” was frequently used to describe
something or someone as “lame,” “uncool,” or, in Gruden’s case,
“weak.”174 Therefore, Gruden may believe that, in using homophobic
slurs, he was not directly disparaging the sexual orientation. Yet, by
associating the term “gay” with these negative terms, Gruden was
inherently stereotyping gay people as “lame,” “uncool,” and “weak.”175
Furthermore, by using a slur with a history of oppressing sexual minorities,
Gruden disparaged the LGBTQ* community as lesser than their
heterosexual counterparts.176
Furthermore, Gruden’s professed ignorance about the harms of his
comments suggests he might not have been aware of his own bias’s
impact.177 Yet, during the time of his comments, Gruden was highly
influential in the league.178 As a head coach, Gruden wielded great
influence over the player composition of his coached teams. In fact, along
with the team’s general manager, Gruden had the final say on drafting,
retaining, and removing players.179 With this amount of influence, it is
possible that Gruden’s disparaging language was not the full extent of the

174. See The Talk of the Nation, Why Is It Ok to Say “That’s So Gay?,” NPR, at 2:07–
2:18 (June 25, 2009, 1:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/105909348?story
Id=105909348 [https://perma.cc/KXF7-63FT]; see also SuchIsLifeVideos, Hilary Duff PSA
“Think Before You Speak” Runs During Hannity, YOUTUBE (Aug. 5, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z8fiwbR96j0&ab_channel=SuchIsLifeVideos
[https://perma.cc/KQM9-XRZE].
175. See Robert Postic & Elizabeth Prough, That’s Gay! Gay as a Slur Among College
Students, 4 SAGE OPEN 1, 2 (2014).
176. See Lauren Ashwell, Gendered Slurs, 42 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 228, 236 (2016)
(“[T]he use of the slur is grounded in thinking of those to whom the slur applies as lesser
than others simply because of something that ought not be thought of as marking you out as
lesser than others.”).
177. It is also possible that Gruden’s thinking evolved from 2011 to 2018 — from being
expressly homophobic to accepting certain societal changes. As Tessa Charlesworth and
Mahzarin Banaji’s article demonstrates, implicit views towards LGBTQ* people have
rapidly changed from negative to positive. See generally Tessa E. S. Charlesworth &
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Patterns of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes: I. Long-Term Change and
Stability from 2007 to 2016, 30 PSYCH. SCI. 174 (2019). While it is not impossible that
Gruden experienced a similar change, empirical cognitive social psychology still supports
Gruden’s possible unawareness of his own bias. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 164, at
1038 (“A well-meaning but implicitly biased decision maker can believe that he is basing a
judgment about a member of a stereotyped group on legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons
when, in fact, the target’s group membership ‘caused’ the decision maker to view the target
in a[n] unjustifiably negative light.”).
178. See Belson & Rosman, supra note 169.
179. See Andrew Garda, A Detailed List of an NFL Coach’s Responsibility, BLEACHER
REP. (June 9, 2013), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1666834-a-detailed-list-of-an-nflcoachs-responsibility [https://perma.cc/6FRU-R26E].
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harm caused by Gruden’s anti-gay beliefs; he could have unconsciously
allowed such beliefs to influence which players made up his teams.
Despite his private association of gay men with weakness, Gruden
publicly posited himself as a proponent of LGBTQ* rights. For example,
in June 2021, Carl Nassib, the Raiders’s defensive lineman, publicly
declared he was gay.180 In response to Nassib coming out,181 Gruden, who
was then the Raiders’s head coach, publicly said that he had “learned a
long time ago what makes a man different is what makes him great.”182 If
Gruden’s emails had not been leaked, the public might have continued
perceiving him as a supporter of gay rights. This dichotomy between
Gruden’s private and public persona may have resulted from his internal
desire and society’s external pressure to be seen as unbiased despite his
true prejudice against the LGBTQ* community.183 Having his private
behavior supported by his co-workers likely also acted as an implicit
endorsement that such behavior was acceptable.184
B. Implicit Bias’s Impact on Employment Discrimination Cases
The courts’ limited use of implicit bias analysis in reviewing summary
judgment motions affects mixed-motive employment discrimination cases
in two ways. First, courts may be unable to recognize discrimination
stemming from implicit bias and improperly rule that a plaintiff failed to

180. See Belson & Rosman, supra note 169 (citing Ken Belson, Raiders’ Carl Nassib
Announces He’s Gay, an N.F.L. First, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/21/sports/football/carl-nassib-gay-nfl.html
[https://perma.cc/JF5W-BQDU]).
181. To “come out” means to self-disclose one’s sexual orientation and/or gender
identity. Coming Out, DEFINITIONS, https://www.definitions.net/definition/COMING%20
OUT [https://perma.cc/SG7R-PKRF] (last visited Mar. 3, 2022).
182. See Kevin Patra, Jon Gruden Praises Carl Nassib: ‘What Makes a Man Different Is
What Makes Him Great,’ NFL (June 22, 2021, 7:48 AM) (citing Vincent Bonsignore,
Raiders DE Becomes First Active NFL Player to Come Out as Gay, L.V. REV.-J. (June 21,
2021, 3:08 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/raiders/raiders-de-becomes-firstactive-nfl-player-to-come-out-as-gay-2383535/?itm_source=parsely-api
[https://perma.cc/8QCD-4Y4T]), https://www.nfl.com/news/jon-gruden-praises-carl-nassibwhat-makes-a-man-different-is-what-makes-him-grea [https://perma.cc/4P6D-8QZ7].
183. See Joel T. Nadler et al., Aversive Discrimination in Employment Interviews:
Reducing Effects of Sexual Orientation Bias with Accountability, 1 PSYCH. SEXUAL
ORIENTATION & GENDER DIVERSITY 480, 482 (2014) (“Internal motivations to appear
egalitarian and aware of cultural norms of diversity and inclusion often result in people
presenting themselves as being more nonprejudiced than they truly are.”).
184. “If group norms support sexual prejudice, and if a heterosexual individual has a
strong need for the group’s approval and acceptance, expressing negative attitudes toward
sexual minorities can be a means to gaining status and positive regard from the group.”
Gregory M. Herek, Beyond “Homophobia”: Thinking More Clearly About Stigma,
Prejudice, and Sexual Orientation, 85 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY S29, S35 (2015).
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satisfy her initial burden.185 Second, the courts may improperly find that an
employer met their same-action defense burden by failing to look at the
defense as a decision influenced by subconscious bias. By dismissing the
employee’s claim, the courts fail to correct implicitly biased and
discriminatory behavior, which can perpetuate discrimination, particularly
aversive discrimination, which may result from implicit bias.186 Aversive
discrimination is a “subtle, often unintentional form of bias that is different
from ‘old-fashioned’ or overt racism or discrimination.”187
Because there is no “smoking gun” with implicit bias, state and federal
courts have struggled to find an effective way to evaluate this potential
unconscious bias.188 In some circumstances, the use of implicit bias is
outright barred; for example, the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes189 decision
set a precedent against using evidence of implicit bias to establish
commonality amongst a class in a class action suit.190 Prior to Dukes,
implicit bias evidence was regularly used in employment discrimination
claims.191 However, the Supreme Court held that such evidence was
insufficient to support a theory of commonality amongst plaintiffs.192
Thankfully, Dukes did not bar implicit bias evidence from individual
plaintiffs’ discrimination claims.193 Outside class certification, plaintiffs
continue to use implicit bias evidence as proof of discrimination when
explicit forms are absent.194
However, not all courts have been so reluctant towards including
implicit bias in Title VII discrimination analysis, even in class certification.
Prior to the Dukes decision, the Southern District Court of New York
addressed a similar problem in Velez v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.195
185. See Christopher Cerullo, Note, Everyone’s a Little Bit Racist? Reconciling Implicit
Bias and Title VII, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 146 (2013).
186. “In the vast majority of cases, law re-inscribes ascriptive hierarchies by leaving
untouched both those hierarchies, as well as the alleged injustices that give rise to
employment civil rights litigation in the first place.” Laura Beth Nielsen, Ellen C. Berrey &
Robert L. Nelson, Dignity and Discrimination: Employment Civil Rights in the Workplace
and in Courts, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1185, 1199 (2017).
187. See Nadler et al., supra note 183, at 481.
188. See Cerullo, supra note 185, at 147–51.
189. 564 U.S. 338, 354 (2011) (holding that an expert witness’s testimony that WalMart’s policies left it vulnerable for gender bias but “could not calculate whether 0.5 or 95
percent of the employment decisions at Wal-Mart might be determined by stereotyped
thinking” did not meet the commonality requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 23(a)(2)).
190. See Jones, supra note 163, at 1238 (citing Dukes, 564 U.S. at 354–55).
191. See id. at 1227.
192. See id. at 1229 (citing Dukes, 564 U.S. at 354–55).
193. See id. at 1230.
194. See id.
195. 244 F.R.D. 243, 258–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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In Velez, a group of 62,000 female employees claimed that their employer’s
“personnel evaluation and management system [was] overly subjective, and
that this subjectivity [led] to discrimination.”196 David Martin, the
plaintiffs’ offered expert, analyzed the employer’s policies for
“vulnerab[ility] to bias in decision[-]making” and found that there was
potential for discrimination.197 While alone this evidence was not
sufficient, combined with the plaintiff’s statistical and anecdotal evidence,
the court supported the class certification.198 While the Velez decision did
not explicitly mention implicit bias, its recognition of how subjectivity
could influence decision-making resembles how implicit bias may taint
seemingly unbiased decisions.
More recently, the Eastern District of Wisconsin considered the role of
implicit bias in Kimble v. Wisconsin Department of Workforce
Development.199 This was the first case explicitly recognizing and relying
on implicit bias cognitive studies.200 In Kimble, the court evaluated the
claim of an African American supervisor, Johnny Kimble, against his
employer, the Equal Rights Division (ERD) of the Wisconsin Department
of Workplace Development. Kimble alleged that the ERD discriminately
denied him a raise. The court found that, while the ERD had provisions for
awarding merit-based raises and bonuses, the generalness of these
provisions necessitated additional, actual criteria.201 The ERD never
established specific policies, which allowed the decisionmaker (who, at the
time, was J. Sheehan Donoghue) to award raises and bonuses without any
objective checks against their biases.202 The court’s opinion relied on the
subjectivity of the Donoghue’s decision-making process and the lack of
any meaningful review of her decisions.203 Given these factors, the system
left “an opening through which any biases or stereotypes could infect the
decision[-]making process.”204
However, courts’ reluctance to incorporate implicit bias analysis when
reviewing an employee’s discrimination claim may not be the only reason
for low plaintiff success. Employers have a low bar in asserting a “same
action” defense; if an employer presents evidence of a lawful factor
sufficient by itself to explain the discharge, the employee will be unable to

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See Jones, supra note 163, at 1228 (citing Velez, 244 F.R.D. at 258).
See id.
See id.
690 F. Supp. 2d 765 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
See Cerullo, supra note 185, at 154.
See id. (citing Kimble, 690 F. Supp. 2d. at 772).
See id.
See id.
Id.
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recover any damages and may only receive attorney’s fees.205 Yet, as
demonstrated by Dukes, some courts may fail to actively engage with the
potential discriminatory motives behind an employer’s seemingly
nondiscriminatory reason. For example, in establishing an affirmative
defense, an employer may claim it would have terminated an LGBTQ*
employee absent a discriminatory motive due to an employee’s lower-thanaverage performance evaluations. However, Velez and Kimble, along with
a 2014 study, show that an unconsciously biased decisionmaker may
evaluate certain employees — such as those belonging to racial out-groups
or sexual minorities — more harshly, resulting in lower performance
evaluation despite similar workstyles and productivity. 206
C. Relevance to the LGBTQ* Community
As discussed in this Note’s introduction, LGBTQ* history has been rife
with fighting for long-deserved rights, including the right to be free from
discrimination at work. While the Bostock opinion seemingly granted this
right, the judiciary’s insufficient recognition of implicit bias analysis
combined with confusing summary judgment standards will particularly
limit LGBTQ* plaintiffs’ ability to establish their mixed-motive cases and
their right to recovery. While increased exposure to LGBTQ* persons,
legalization of same-sex marriage, and prohibition of employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity have

205. See Richard A. Weller, The Mixed-Motive Defense in Workplace Discrimination
Actions and Its Procedural Issues in the Eleventh Circuit, 51 MERCER L. REV. 745, 758
(2000). It should be noted that plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees can be quite substantial. See, e.g.,
Hernandez v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 3d 100 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding that
$825,621.77 in attorney fees was reasonable for a suit filed under Title VII).
206. See Nadler et al., supra note 183, at 485 (“[H]igh self-monitors were more likely to
use stereotypes to evaluate applicants than low self-monitors, who were more likely to make
evaluations using performance related factors.” (citing Tilman L. Sheets & Stephen C.
Bushardt, Effects of the Applicant’s Gender-Appropriateness and Qualifications and Rater
Self-Monitoring Propensities on Hiring Decisions, 23 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 373, 374–75
(1994))); see also Velez v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 244 F.R.D. 243, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(holding that the systemically giving of lower scores to women compared to men presents a
serious question of discrimination); Cerullo, supra note 185, at 154 n.254 (“Individuals
draw lines and create categories based in part on race, gender and ethnicity, and the
stereotypes they create can bias how they process and interpret information and how they
judge other people.” (quoting Kimble v. Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d
765, 776 (E.D. Wis. 2010))).
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changed public consensus about LGBTQ*,207 many still struggle with an
unconscious bias towards the community.208
As mentioned, the public attitude towards the LGBTQ* community has
had a dramatic shift in the positive direction.209 This has created a
corresponding change in implicit bias towards them. According to a 2019
study conducted at Harvard University, implicit LGBTQ* bias has rapidly
decreased, dropping 33% from 2007 to the end of 2016.210 However, it has
not yet reached neutrality,211 meaning that the general U.S. population
remains at least somewhat implicitly biased against LGBTQ*
individuals.212 This lingering bias may be due, in part, to LGBTQ*
identities deviating from the cultural norm of heterosexuality and
cisgenderism.213 Those discomforted by such deviations may “create and
defend their stereotypes to preserve or protect their normative societal
model of sexuality.”214 Jillian T. Weiss, a transgender employment and
civil rights lawyer, succinctly describes this modern reality: “Even if there
are fewer bigots who are out to discriminate, there is still implicit bias, so
some managers can’t help but see a transgender person as a weirdo.”215
Some employers attempt to combat more overt biases through
antidiscrimination policies.216 However, policy alone may not be adequate

207. See Charlesworth & Banaji, supra note 177, at 181–82 (“In the United States
today . . . sexuality attitudes appear to be societally prioritized . . . and therefore are more
frequently discussed . . . . Societal priority corresponds to more frequent and repeated
exposure to debate or counterarguments that may, in turn, induce greater attitude change.”).
208. As of 2016, 56% of respondents in Charlesworth’s and Banaji’s survey still held
weak, moderate, or strong pro-straight preferences. See Carey Goldberg, Study: Bias Drops
Dramatically for Sexual Orientation and Race — But Not Weight, WBUR (Jan. 11, 2019),
https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/01/11/implicit-bias-gay-black-weight
[https://perma.cc/KF8X-Z8QQ] (citing Charlesworth & Banaji, supra note 177).
209. See infra Section I.B.
210. See Charlesworth & Banaji, supra note 177, at 182.
211. Implicit bias towards LGBTQ* persons is expected to pass neutrality by January
2025 and September 2045. See id.
212. These changes in attitude towards sexuality have been gradual and may be caused
by period effects. See id. at 182. This means that even if implicit attitudes towards sexuality
are moving towards neutrality, the fact that it has yet to implies still-existing implicit antiLGBTQ* beliefs.
213. This concept of heterosexuality as the norm is also known as heteronormativity.
Heteronormativity, APA DICTIONARY PSYCH., https://dictionary.apa.org/heteronormativity
[https://perma.cc/55JV-KSSK] (last visited Mar. 3, 2022).
214. See Nadler et al., supra note 183, at 482.
215. See, e.g., Jenny B. Davis, Advocating for Authenticity, ABA J., Oct.–Nov. 2021, at
10.
216. See Valerie Bolden-Barrett, Human Rights Campaign Awards 570 US Companies a
Perfect Score on LGBTQ Equality, HRDIVE (April 2, 2019), https://www.hrdive.com/news/
human-rights-campaign-awards-570-us-companies-a-perfect-score-on-lgbtq-equa/551676/
[https://perma.cc/U6P9-E2N9] (“16.8 million U.S. employees have a corporate non-
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to prevent aversive discrimination. For example, according to a 2014 study
observing the effects of egalitarian hiring norms and accountability
procedures on aversive discrimination, having nondiscriminatory hiring
norms did not mitigate the effects of aversive discrimination against gay
men.217 Observing the interview process gives a better insight into these
lingering biases since it is “particularly vulnerable to subjective biases,
prejudices, and stereotypes on the part of interviewers.”218
However, these biases persist past the hiring process. According to a
2020 McKinsey report, many LGBTQ* employees believe that they must
outperform their non-LGBTQ* colleagues to gain recognition.219 Around
40% of LGBTQ* women felt they needed to provide extra evidence of
their competence as compared to their non-LGBTQ* peers.220 This is not a
new phenomenon; Black women have reported feeling a similar need to
work twice as hard as their white peers, and studies reveal employers hold
Black workers to a stricter standard than their white peers.221
Even pro-LGBTQ employers may demonstrate an implicit preference for
more “conventional” forms of a queer identity, such as transgender men
and women, versus their “unconventional” counterparts, such as nonbinary
or agender persons.222 This may be due to many transgender men and
women adhering to binary rules of man-woman, which largely dominate

discrimination policy protecting them from sexual orientation or gender identity
discrimination.”).
217. See Nadler et al., supra note 183, at 485.
218. Id. at 480 (citing R.D. AVERY & R.H. FALEY, FAIRNESS IN SELECTING EMPLOYEES
213 (2d ed. 1988)).
219. See PETER BALLINSON ET AL., MCKINSEY Q., LGBTQ* VOICES, LIVING FROM
LEARNED EXPERIENCES 6 (2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/peopleand-organizational-performance/our-insights/lgbtq-plus-voices-learning-from-livedexperiences#download/%2F~%2Fmedia%2Fmckinsey%2Fbusiness%20functions%2Fpeopl
e%20and%20organizational%20performance%2Four%20insights%2Flgbtq%20plus%20voi
ces%20learning%20from%20lived%20experiences%2Flgbtq-learning-from-livedexperiences-web-final.pdf%3FshouldIndex%3Dfalse [https://perma.cc/PBB5-LWFQ].
220. See id.
221. See Michele Heyward, Black Women Need to Be Twice as Good in Workplace,
POSITIVE HIRE, https://positivehire.co/black-women-need-to-be-twice-as-good-in-workplace
/ [https://perma.cc/F32Y-UHUC] (last visited Mar. 3, 2022); see also Gillian B. White,
Black Workers Really Do Need to Be Twice as Good, ATLANTIC (Oct. 7, 2015) (citing
Costas Cavounidis & Kevin Lang, Discrimination and Worker Evaluation (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 21612, 2015)), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/arc
hive/2015/10/why-black-workers-really-doneed-to-be-twice-as-good/409276/
[https://perma.cc/8WFR-DWSW] (explaining how higher levels of scrutiny for Black
employees feed patterns of unemployment in the Black community).
222. See Kelly K. Dray et al., Moving Beyond the Gender Binary: Examining Workplace
Perceptions of Nonbinary and Transgender Employees, 27 GENDER, WORK, & ORG. 1181,
1183 (2020).
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our society.223 Conversely, nonbinary individuals “identify and often act
outside of the gender binary . . . and are less able to fit into society’s views
of gender as a result.”224 For example, nonbinary individuals who are
“out” at work are more likely to be denied a promotion compared to
transgender men and women.225
While knowledge of nonbinary
226
individuals is growing,
many still believe nonbinary identities to be
attention-seeking or “a phase.”227 This paternalism invalidates nonbinary
people’s identity and signals a limited, binary understanding of gender.
Because there is no “smoking gun” with implicit bias, many aversively
discriminated LGBTQ* plaintiffs will likely not have direct evidence of
such discrimination. This will force those in the Eighth and Fifth Circuits
to fit their mixed-motive case into McDonell Douglas’s single-motive
standard. Even those using the 2000e-2m standard must attempt to prove a
type of discrimination that courts have not widely recognized with
evidence that courts usually will not accept.
For LGBTQ* employees who work at will, it can be even more difficult
to tell when aversive discrimination has even occurred. This is because
EAW “supports inconsistent, even irrational, management behavior by
permitting arbitrary, not work-related, treatment of employees.”228 This
inconsistency in behavior may allow bias to persist, as there is no standard
for employees to differentiate discriminatory decisions from arbitrary ones.
For example, in the absence of just-cause provisions, an employer can cite
“performance issues, or budget cuts, or the generic need for new corporate
direction” as justification for terminating an employee.229 Yet, according
to a 2019 study of low-wage fast-food workers in New York City, all of
whom are at will, 72% of employees felt that their employers did not have

223. See id.
224. Id.
225. See id. (citing Skylar Davidson, Gender Inequality: Nonbinary Transgender People
in the Workplace, 2 COGENT SOC. SCIS. 1 (2016)).
226. “[A]bout a quarter (26%) say they know someone who prefers that others use
gender-neutral pronouns such as ‘they’ instead of ‘he’ or ‘she’ when referring to them, up
from 18% in 2018 . . . .” Rachel Minkin & Anna Brown, Rising Shares of U.S. Adults Know
Someone Who Is Transgender or Goes by Gender-Neutral Pronouns, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July
27, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/07/27/rising-shares-of-u-s-adultsknow-someone-who-is-transgender-or-goes-by-gender-neutral-pronouns/
[https://perma.cc/256R-WYFD].
227. See Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 910–11 (2019).
228. Tara J. Radin & Patricia H. Werhane, Employment-at-Will, Employee Rights, and
Future Directions for Employment, 13 BUS. ETHICS. Q. 113, 114 (2003).
229. Sarah Jones, To Truly Protect LGBTQ Workers, Get Rid of At-Will Employment,
INTELLIGENCER (June 15, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/06/at-will-employ
ment-leaves-lgbtq-workers-vulnerable.html [https://perma.cc/LM3M-GVQT].
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consistent expectations for performance, attendance, and customer
service.230
Furthermore, many at-will workers are denied basic explanations for
their terminations,231 which can further complicate deciphering an arbitrary
firing from a discriminatory one. Determining employer motive is
especially difficult when the decisionmaker’s bias is not explicit, subjective
decisions are left unchecked by objective standards, and companies’
policies appear egalitarian. Even when reasons are given, an employee
may not have access to information that would allow them to better assess
the merits of their potential case.232 This can chill lawsuits in the first place
since at-will employees will often be unsure of whether their termination
was motivated by discrimination or, perhaps, some errant comment made
the week before.233
Gruden’s case is an example of this information gap. As noted,
Gruden’s use of slurs was more explicit than the implicit bias commonly
present in subjective decision-making systems.
However, he was
seemingly unaware of its impacts and expressed these views outside of
many employees’ purview. Yet, Gruden could have acted on these views,
even unconsciously. Even if Gruden believed himself to not be biased
against LGBTQ* individuals, his inherent characterization of gay peoples
as effeminate may have influenced his decisions to not draft or retain
certain players based on their sexual orientation, perceived or otherwise. If
this happened, players were likely unaware of such discriminatory motive,
especially with Gruden publicly presenting himself as a proponent of
LGBTQ* rights.
Furthermore, Gruden’s shift from synonymizing
LGBTQ* peoples with weakness to public support of their rights is a
microcosm of the larger societal acceptance of the LGBTQ* community —
and just as sudden.
The higher likelihood of LGBTQ* persons being in poverty also makes
them more vulnerable to the harmful aftereffects of employment
discrimination. From 2014 to 2017, LGBTQ* people had a 15% to 17%
higher risk of being poor than cisgender straight people.234 This risk

230. See CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY ET AL., FIRED ON A WHIM: THE PRECARIOUS
EXISTENCE OF NYC FAST-FOOD WORKERS 12 (2019), https://www.populardemocracy.org
/sites/default/files/Just%20Cause%20Complete%20Final%20%20Web%20V2%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ4D-4Y8M].
231. See id. at 1.
232. See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases so Hard to Win?,
61 LA. L. REV. 555, 570 (2001).
233. See Schwartz, supra note 22 (discussing how an at-will employee can be discharged
“for a single mistake”).
234. See M.V. LEE BADGETT, SOON KYU CHOI & BIANCA D.M. WILSON, UCLA SCH. OF
L., LGBT POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 5 (2019), https://williamsinstitute.law.
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increased to 16% to 22% in 2021.235 This higher risk of poverty also
means that, if fired, LGBTQ* employees are less likely to have adequate
emergency savings to support themselves while being unemployed and
finding work.236 Those in low-wage jobs, like the food service industry,
are also likely to experience financial hardship because of their sudden atwill termination.237 Transgender and non-gender-conforming employees
who lose jobs due to bias also experience four times the rate of
homelessness compared to those who did not lose a job due to bias.238
Therefore, a recently terminated at-will LGBTQ* employee on the brink
of poverty will have little time to consider the motives of their employer.
Rather, to avoid homelessness, medical turmoil, or further indebtedness,
they must immediately begin searching for new work and filing for
unemployment (if they qualify). This urgency to find new work and the
costs of litigation are likely to deter potential plaintiffs from pursuing
claims, even if they are meritorious.
Kei Hopkins’s alleged experience illustrates this dichotomy. In
November 2017, Hopkins was working as a job coach in Cleveland for
Vocational Guidance Services.239 Kei identifies as nonbinary — neither
male nor female — and uses the gender-neutral pronouns “they” and
“them.”240 One day at work, a client saw Kei’s painted nails and began
lobbing gay slurs. Kei reported the episode, assuming the company would

ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/National-LGBT-Poverty-Oct-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T9AP-4H2N].
235. The Complexity of LGBT Poverty in the United States, INST. FOR RSCH. ON POVERTY
(June 2021), https://www.irp.wisc.edu/resource/the-complexity-of-lgbt-poverty-in-theunited-states/ [https://perma.cc/9SSA-Q5BE].
236. See Francisco Velasquez, Over Half of Americans Have Less Than 3 Months Worth
of
Emergency
Savings,
CNBC
(July
28,
2021,
12:03
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/28/51percent-of-americans-have-less-than-3-months-worthof-emergency-savings.html [https://perma.cc/STN8-JD4U] (“Low-income households are
much more likely to not have adequate emergency savings . . . .”).
237. See CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY ET AL., supra note 230.
238. JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY & NAT’L GAY
LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 3 (2011).
239. See Ashley Wong, A Patchwork of Anti-Discrimination Laws Don’t Protect LGBTQ
Workers, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (June 15, 2020), https://publicintegrity.org/inequalitypoverty-opportunity/workers-rights/workplace-inequities/injustice-at-work/a-patchwork-ofanti-discrimination-laws-dont-protect-lgbtq-workers/ [https://perma.cc/6E2A-7KUK].
240. Pronouns are used by both transgender and cisgender people to refer to someone in
the third person. It should be noted that pronouns are not always indicative of gender. See
How Do I Use Personal Pronouns?, MYPRONOUNS.ORG, https://www.mypronouns.org/how
[https://perma.cc/23JG-5VHG] (last visited Mar. 3, 2022) (“A person could be a man or a
woman or both or neither and share any number of these sets of pronouns as the correct ones
to use for them, but which set they go by is not necessarily indicative of their gender.”).
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support them as it had never been openly transphobic to them before.241
But the next day, the company fired Kei — allegedly for sleeping on the
job a few days before.242 Kei claimed that on that day, they were resting
during break time, trying to get relief from pain caused by treatment for a
jaw disorder.243 Nevertheless, Kei could do nothing but sign their notice of
termination, knowing they were an at-will employee and that filing a
complaint in the state of Ohio would present a legal ordeal.244
Some believe that anti-LGBTQ* sentiment is a relic restricted to the
rural United States.245 While it is true that many LGBTQ* people live in
urban areas,246 moving to cities to avoid the assumed prejudice of rural
United States247 or for employment opportunities, this does not exclude
them from being victimized by prejudice. Even in the most “liberal”
metropolitan areas, such as New York City, there may still be the bigoted
employer and the discriminated employee.248 Therefore, while urban areas
are more accepting than rural areas (due in part to rural United States’s
lingering anti-LGBTQ conservative beliefs),249 city limits are not a shield
against discrimination.

241. See Wong, supra note 239.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See, e.g., Silas House, Opinion, Small Towns, Small Hearts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/opinion/the-battle-for-gay-rights-in-rural-amer
ica.html [https://perma.cc/6WAU-6R5D] (“The equality divide [for LGBTQ* persons] we
face is no longer between red and blue states, but between urban and rural America. Even as
we celebrate victories like this month’s Supreme Court order on same-sex marriage, the real
front in the battle for equality remains the small towns that dot America’s landscape.”).
246. Metropolitan areas like San Francisco, Seattle, and even Salt Lake City have
LGBTQ* populations higher than the national average of 4%. See Scott Van Voorhis, What
Cities Have the Largest Percentage of LGBT Residents?, THESTREET (May 31, 2018, 2:31
PM), https://www.thestreet.com/personal-finance/cities-with-largest-percentage-of-lgbt-resi
dents-14605660 [https://perma.cc/KRK7-GLAS].
247. “Compounding rural male gender anxiety is the reality that, unlike in urban areas
where many models of acceptable masculinity coexist, small towns offer few competing
visions of normative masculinity.” Luke A. Boso, Policing Masculinity in Small-Town
America, 23 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 345, 355 (2014).
248. Demonstrative of this fact are the court dockets for the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern and Southern District of New York — which cover “progressive” metropolitan
areas like New York City and Brooklyn — from June 15, 2020 onwards. According to
Bloomberg Law’s docket database, since the Bostock decision, these courts had 239
employment civil rights complaints containing the words “Title VII” and “sexual
orientation” or “gender identity” filed.
249. See Boso, supra note 247, at 360.
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III. PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
Some have argued that the shift from litigation to arbitration has the
potential to enhance equality of access to justice for employees.250
Arbitration differs from traditional litigation in that there is “more limited
discovery, less frequent use of summary judgment motions, and less
stringent application of the rules of evidence.”251 While this seemingly
addresses employment discrimination cases’ frequent dismissals at
summary judgment, the reality of arbitration proves different.
The defining characteristic of mandatory arbitration is that the employer
unilaterally creates its procedure as a term and condition of employment.252
This includes choosing which, if any, arbitrator service provider will
administer the arbitrator and the rules of conduct for the arbitration.253
While unionized workplaces have a polarizing force of a union in the labor
arbitrator selection process, this is absent in nonunion workplaces.254
Therefore, compared to larger employers who more frequently participate
in employment arbitration, individual nonunion employees are at a distinct
disadvantage.255
Employers are also systematically much more likely to be repeat players
in arbitration, especially employers enforcing mandatory arbitration.256
Because arbitrators repeatedly see the same employers, they might tend to
favor employers in arbitration in the hopes of securing future business.257
In a unionized workplace, this favoritism is offset by unions also being
repeat players.258 However, it is rare for an individual employee to be a
repeat arbitration participant, meaning there is no counterbalance in
nonunionized workplaces.259

250. See Colvin, supra note 123, at 72 (citing Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws:
The Stakes in the Debate over Pre-Disupte Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO
ST. J. ON. DISP. RESOL. 559, 561 (2001)).
251. Id. at 74.
252. See id. at 76.
253. See id.
254. See Alexander J.S. Colvin & Mark D. Gough, Individual Employment Rights
Arbitration in the United States: Actors and Outcomes, 68 CORNELL INDUS. & LAB. RELS.
REV. 1019, 1021 (2015).
255. See id.
256. See Alexander J. S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 11 (2011).
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id.; see also Colvin & Gough, supra note 254.
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The decisions of these mandatory arbitrations demonstrate this
imbalance of power and employer favoritism. According to a 2011
study,260 employees won261 only 21.4% of employer-promulgated
arbitration procedures — compared to the 36.4% win rate for federal court
litigations.262 This employee win rate drops further during a “repeatemployer-arbitrator pairing” in which an employer has previously used an
arbitrator.263 Among cases in which the employee received some amount
of monetary damages, the median amount was $36,500, and the mean
award was $109,858.264 This is far lower than the damages awarded in
employment litigation, which had a median award of $150,500.265
Furthermore, the arbitration system undermines one of the public policy
goals of antidiscrimination law, which is to deter and educate prospective
violators.266 Arbitration is a private system with generally confidential
outcomes.267 Unlike courts, members of the public cannot attend

260. This study focused on arbitration decisions published by the American Arbitration
Association in compliance with Section 1281.96 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.
“Under the California Civil Procedure Code, organizations that provide arbitration services
within the state are required to make available to the public certain prescribed information
on arbitration cases administered by the service provider that involve consumers.” See
Colvin, supra note 256, at 3. This information includes:
[T]he name of the employer, the name of the arbitrator, the prevailing party, the
amount awarded, and whether the employee was self-represented. However,
information regarding employee characteristics, types of claims being filed (e.g.,
FLSA, contract, Title VII), and the arbitrator’s complete written award are not
covered by these disclosure requirements.
See Colvin & Gough, supra note 254, at 1026. The study analyzes 3,945 arbitration cases, of
which 1,213 were decided by an award after a hearing, filed and reaching disposition
between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2007. See Colvin, supra note 256, at 4. While
this Note would like to have a more limited analysis of Title VII arbitration decisions, it is
difficult to limit success rates of certain types of claims as information about claim types are
not required to be disclosed. See Colvin & Gough, supra note 254, at 1026.
261. Wins were classified “as including any case in which some award of damages,
however small, is made in favor of the employee.” Colvin, supra note 256, at 5.
262. See id. at 5, 6.
263. See id. at 14 (“Whereas the employee win rate was 23.4 percent in cases that did not
involve a repeat-employer–arbitrator pairing, the employee win rate was only 12.0 percent
in cases involving a repeat pairing . . . .”).
264. See id. at 7.
265. See id. (citing Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of
Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 44 (2003)). Colvin’s
study was unable to compare the award outcomes of systematically matched cases in
litigation and arbitration. See id. at 4.
266. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment
Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 427 (1999) (citing Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975) (stating that federal court relief under Title VII not
only compensates victims but also vindicates broader public interest in deterring future
discrimination)).
267. See id. at 402.
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arbitration hearings, and there is no public record of filings, the hearing, or
the award.268 Therefore, even the rare arbitration decisions in favor of the
employee are only known to the parties of the suit. This privacy undercuts
the deterrent effect found in public court decisions. For example, an
employer publicly sanctioned through litigation for racial discrimination in
hiring “may deter another employer from gender discrimination in hiring
or, indeed, in promotions”269 and “stigmatizes the violator . . . [deterring]
other employers who seek to avoid that same stigma.”270 Conversely, in
arbitration, there is no public knowledge of this sanction. Both the lack of
a public record of arbitration proceedings and decisions and the fact that
employers are rarely sanctioned in arbitration make arbitration a less than
promising alternative to litigation.
B. In-House & Educational Solutions
Daniel Masakayan, an employer-side associate at McGuireWoods, LLP
who has frequently written about employment issues,271 argues that using
Title VII to address aversive discrimination would only further burden
plaintiffs and potentially worsen discrimination.272 He cites Supreme Court
precedent, such as Dukes and Price Waterhouse, stating that the Court has
only provided “insufficient guidance” in these cases.273 To Masakayan,
this “insufficient guidance . . . results in uncertainty for courts and
additional barriers for victims of unconscious discrimination.”274
While admirable for its outside-of-court focus, Masakayan’s solution of
using education and training towards eliminating implicit bias may allow
biased employers to exert subjective discretion on educational programs
and trainings.275 If employers and decisionmakers are unconsciously
discriminating against LGBTQ* employees, then placing employers in a
position to determine what programs correct implicit bias may do little to
mitigate discrimination. Furthermore, two-thirds of human resource
specialists report that diversity training has no positive effects.276

268. See id.
269. Id. at 431.
270. Id. (citing PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 12 (1997)).
271. See Daniel Masakayan, JD SUPRA, https://www.jdsupra.com/authors/daniel-mas
akayan1/ [https://perma.cc/NXC9-K99M] (last visited Mar. 3, 2022).
272. See generally Daniel Masakayan, The Unconscious Discrimination Paradox: How
Expanding Title VII to Incorporate Implicit Bias Cannot Solve the Issues Posed by
Unconscious Discrimination, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 246 (2017).
273. See id. at 259–60.
274. Id. at 260.
275. See id. at 283–85.
276. See Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why Doesn’t Diversity Training Work?: The
Challenge for Industry and Academia, 10 ANTHROPOLOGY NOW 48, 48–49 (2018).
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Some may argue that it is not the trainings themselves that are
insufficient but rather the length of the programs. After all, unlearning
unconscious bias requies altering one’s subconscious, which likely requires
more than one training session about implicit bias.277 In response,
advocates of anti-bias trainings, like Masakayan, may argue for longer
curriculums. While longer-term curriculums have been shown to reduce
bias,278 employers may be resistant to costly programs.279 For example,
Starbucks, which closed 8,000 stores for half a day to train 175,000
workers, lost $12 million in doing so.280 To match the recommended
curriculum best suited for reducing bias, they would need a dozen half-day
sessions, every year, for more than half the workforce, which grows by
10,000 new workers every year.281 While any reasonable employer seeks
to mitigate employment discrimination claims, the costs associated with
implementing effective anti-bias trainings are likely too untenable.
Similarly, Masakayan’s suggestion of teaching students about implicit
bias early and exposing them to diverse groups through the education
system is laudable in principle but difficult in practice.282 It is true that
contact and exposure with out-groups, such as sexual minorities, mitigates
bias but only when that contact is actual and sustained.283 Simply being in
an area with a higher gay population will not impact bias.284 Therefore, for
Masakayan’s proposal to work, students must have long-term exposure to
out-groups.
However, implementing programs with long-term exposure to these outgroups may be difficult. Affirmative action policies that prioritize sexual
minorities in admissions may be deemed unconstitutional under the
Supreme Court’s strict judicial standard.285 The recent Supreme Court
ruling in Fisher v. University of Texas286 held that colleges must
demonstrate that they are using race in admissions only when “necessary,”

277. See id. at 49.
278. See id. (citing Patricia G. Devine et al., Long-Term Reduction in Implicit Race Bias:
A Prejudice Habit-Breaking Intervention, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1267 (2012)).
279. See id.; see also Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool
for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 674 (2003).
280. See Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 276, at 49.
281. See id.
282. See Masakayan, supra note 272, at 284–85.
283. See Jordan Axt, Intergroup Contact and Explicit and Implicit Biases, PROJECT
IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/user/jaxt/blogposts/piblogpost009.html [https:
//perma.cc/GQ9W-752P] (last visited Mar. 3, 2022).
284. See id.
285. See generally Gregory K. Davis, Creating A Roadmap to a LGBTQ Affirmative
Action Scheme: An Article on Parallel Histories, the Diversity Rationale, and Escaping
Strict Scrutiny, 26 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 43 (2017).
286. 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
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meaning no other method could produce the same results.287 Therefore, it
is possible that, if a court were to review an LGBTQ* affirmative action
scheme under the same standard, it would have to establish “a sexual
minority-conscious admissions plan was ‘necessary’ to bringing about the
benefits of sexual orientation diversity in the classroom and on campus.”288
Barring a constitutional law argument, eight states have banned affirmative
action in totality.289 In 2014, these states made up 29% of all U.S. high
school students.290 Under Masakayan’s solution, this 29% of students
would have no guarantee of long-term exposure to out-groups in their
education.
IV. HOW TO APPLY TITLE VII TO THE MODERN ERA
A. Including Implicit Bias in the 2000e-2(m) Standard
As previously discussed in Section II.C, LGBTQ* people are
particularly at risk of having their claims improperly dismissed. Some
courts, like those involved in Kimble and Velez, have begun to understand
the importance of including implicit bias in their analysis. Courts that
recognize implicit bias evidence usually analyze it through expert witness
testimony, as done in Kimble.291 Since it is at the summary judgment stage
where most discrimination cases falter,292 it is important to know whether
such testimony is applicable pre-trial. Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, expert witnesses are allowed to testify on summary
judgment.293 The evidence submitted in connection with summary
judgment also does not necessarily have to be presented in an admissible

287. See id. at 2208.
288. Davis, supra note 285, at 74.
289. See Halley Potter, What Can We Learn from States That Ban Affirmative Action?,
CENTURY FOUND. (June 26, 2014), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/what-can-we-learnfrom-states-that-ban-affirmative-action/?session=1 [https://perma.cc/AR5U-LZTS].
290. See id.
291. See Jones, supra note 163, at 1227 (“Most commonly, implicit-bias evidence was
presented in the form of expert testimony on behalf of class action plaintiffs . . . .”); see also
id. at 1233, 1234 (first citing Expert Report of Steven L. Neuberg at 3-7, Palgut v. City of
Colo. Springs, No. 06-CV-042 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2010) (explaining how experts may
introduce testimony summarizing brain cognition research on how and why individuals
revert to implicit biases when making decisions), then citing Samaha v. Wash. State Dep’t
of Transp., No. CV-10-175, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190352, at *10–11 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 3,
2012) (finding that Dr. Greenwald’s expert testimony on IAT research could be admitted
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702)).
292. See Stone, supra note 159.
293. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993) (applying expert testimony admissibility standard to expert affidavits in motion for
summary judgment).
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form.294 This means that, even if an expert witness’s testimony would not
be admitted in its current form in a normal trial, it can be supplementary to
other evidence offered by the plaintiff at the summary judgment stage.
Even Price Waterhouse indirectly included evidence of implicit bias
through an expert witness.295 During trial, Dr. Susan Fiske, a social
psychologist and Associate Professor of Psychology at Carnegie-Mellon
University, testified about how sex stereotyping affected the Price
Waterhouse’s partnership selection process.296 According to Dr. Fiske,
“the subjectivity of the evaluations made it likely that sharply critical
remarks such as [those experienced by Hopkins] were the product of sex
stereotyping.”297 This subjectivity assessment later surfaces in the courts’
decision in Kimble298 and Velez.299 Therefore, the Supreme Court, whether
intentionally or not, left the door open for expert witnesses to demonstrate
implicit bias.
However, expert witnesses are expensive, and many plaintiffs cannot
afford them.300 Instead, courts could allow a plaintiff to establish a Title
VII discrimination claim through implicit bias evidence and view an
employer’s “same-action” defense in light of this demonstrated bias.
Implicit bias analysis under Title VII could be introduced either through (1)
federal judges educating themselves about its impacts and, subsequently,
incorporating it into their decisions or (2) amendments to Title VII
explicitly advocating for its inclusion. In assessing discrimination cases,
judges already rely on “intuitive” or “common sense” psychological
theories in constructing and justifying their application of legal
doctrines.301 Therefore, incorporating implicit bias — a well-known302

294. See Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532,
539 (4th Cir. 2015), as amended (June 24, 2015) (finding that the district court did not err in
considering experts’ reports at summary judgment as the admissibility of the reports is
immaterial if the anticipated admissible form is explained by submitting party).
295. 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
296. See id.
297. See id. at 235–36.
298. 600 F. Supp. 2d. 765, 772 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
299. 244 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Jones, supra note 163, at 1228.
300. According to the SEAK’s 2017 National Guide to Expert Witness Fees and Billing
Procedures, the median testimony hourly fee for non-medical expert witnesses is $275/hour.
See Expert Witness Fees: How Much Does an Expert Witness Cost?, SEAK EXPERT
WITNESS DIRECTORY, https://blog.seakexperts.com/expert-witness-fees-how-much-does-anexpert-witness-cost/ [https://perma.cc/27UU-SYSZ] (last visited Mar. 3, 2022).
Furthermore, 31% of all experts (including medical) charge a minimum number of hours for
trial testimony. See id. These high costs may dissuade a plaintiff from using expert witness
testimony.
301. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 164, at 1006.
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phenomenon based on decades of scientific research303 — is simply an
extension of applying these “common sense” theories.
Altering how judges analyze discrimination cases by incorporating a
third step to the 2000e-2(m) mixed-motive analysis could be a way for
judges to apply an implicit bias analysis. For example, in Lapsley v.
Columbia University-College of Physicians & Surgeons,304 the Southern
District of New York proposed such a process for determining whether
discrimination, “subtle or otherwise,”305 exists. First, the jury evaluates the
proof offered by the plaintiff, whether direct or circumstantial. The jury
then evaluates the defendant’s evidence that no discrimination occurred in
making its decision. Finally, the jury ponders the evidence as a whole,
rather than separately, in deciding whether actual discrimination occurred
or whether a sufficient inference can be drawn supporting an “ultimate”
finding of intentional discrimination.
Judges could include implicit bias analysis by applying an altered
Lapsley analysis when assessing mixed-motive summary judgment
motions. At summary judgment, courts could evaluate an employer’s
“same-action” defense through the lens of the plaintiff’s prima facie case,
which can also be established through evidence of implicit bias, such as
highly subjective decision-making.306 For example, assume a gay male
plaintiff established that his employer evaluated gay men more harshly than
their heterosexual counterparts in performance reviews. Upon reviewing
the employer’s defense, the court should be skeptical of any assertion that
the employer would have made the same decision because of the plaintiff’s
low evaluations.
Conversely, Congress could legislatively incorporate implicit bias by
following in its footsteps and issuing an act like the 1991 CRA. One
strategy could be overriding the Dukes precedent, which some consider a

302. See Jerry Kang, What Judges Can Do About Implicit Bias, 57 CT. REV. 78, 78
(2021) (“But now, the idea of implicit bias circulates widely in both popular and academic
discussions. Even the casually interested judge knows a great deal about the topic.”).
303. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 164, at 1034; see also John T. Jost et al., The
Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and
Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies That No Manager
Should Ignore, 29 RSCH. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 42 (2009) (“The evidence . . . is
strong enough to conclude that implicit bias is a genuine phenomenon that requires
thoughtful analysis and a meaningful consideration of practical interventions and forms of
redress.”).
304. 999 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
305. See id. at 515–16.
306. Under the Kimble standard, such evidence would likely be considered circumstantial
evidence. See Anthony Kakoyannis, Note, Assessing the Viability of Implicit Bias Evidence
in Discrimination Cases: An Analysis of the Most Significant Federal Cases, 69 FL. L. REV.
1181, 1191–92 (2017).
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fatal blow to implicit bias’s inclusion in Title VII.307 For example,
Congress could emphasize Desert Palace’s assertion that circumstantial
evidence can prove discrimination, even absent direct evidence. If
Congress does decide to override the Dukes decision, it should be aware of
the judiciary’s responses to its previous overrides and act to limit such
resistance.308
B. Removing McDonnell Douglas from Mixed-Motive
Summary Judgments
While the 2000e-2(m) standard has been embraced by most circuits,
many still offer the McDonnell Douglas standard in some variation at the
summary judgment stage. However, applying the McDonnell Douglas
pretext standard contradicts Congress’s intention in enacting Title VII and
clarifying the mixed-motive standard in the 1991 CRA. In Wright v.
Murray Guard, Inc.,309 a Sixth Circuit case preceding the White v. Baxter
decision, Judge Moore, writing for the majority and a separate concurring
opinion, observed that McDonnell Douglas’s pretext framework might
unjustly terminate some mixed-motive claims at summary judgment. 310
In her concurrence, Judge Moore concisely described the flaws of both
the Fifth Circuit’s modified and the Eighth Circuit’s unmodified
McDonnell Douglas approach, offering a hypothetical circumstance where
a discriminatory reason played some role in a plaintiff’s adverse
employment decision.311 While the plaintiff may not be able to assert a
prima facie case, they might still be able to present evidence that a
discriminatory reason motivated the decision.312 Analyzing this claim
under McDonnell Douglas would bar what would otherwise be a successful
mixed-motive claim.313 McDonnell Douglas is aimed at “smoking out” the

307. See Jones, supra note 163, at 1230 n.56 (first citing Roger W. Reinsch & Sonia
Goltz, You Can’t Get There from Here: Implications of the Wal-Mart v. Dukes Decision for
Addressing Second-Generation Discrimination, 9 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 264, 274 (2014);
then citing ALLAN G. KING & CAROLE F. WILDER, LITTLER, DUKES V. WAL-MART: SOME
CLOSED DOORS AND OPEN ISSUES 5 (2012), https://www.littler.com/files/The_Littler
_Report_Dukes_vs_Wal-Mart_2-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/FW5A-Z2UN]).
308. See Widiss, supra note 62, at 548–51 (explaining how courts still apply Price
Waterhouse to various employment discrimination statutes despite Congress’s indication
that it undermined the “fundamental” principle that perpetrators of discrimination must be
held liable for their actions); see also id. at 563.
309. 455 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2006).
310. See id. at 717 (Moore, J., concurring).
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. See id.

954

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIX

single, ultimate reason for adverse employment; mixed-motive claims do
not fit neatly into such a narrow framework.314
Applying the rationale of Judge Moore’s concurrence to a real-life
hypothetical better illustrates her points. Assume that an LGBTQ* plaintiff
files a Title VII mixed-motive discrimination claim in the Eighth Circuit.
She claims that her employer discharged her because she is LGBTQ*,
though her employer claims her discharge was because of budget cuts.
Even if the plaintiff can prove that her employer terminated her in a
discriminatory manner, her employer can rebut her prima facie case by
producing, not proving, a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, such as
the aforementioned budget cuts. The plaintiff is now left with the grueling
task of demonstrating that her employer’s proffered reason was pretextual
for the “true,” discriminatory reason. If there are multiple reasons for her
termination — such as her LGBTQ* status and budget cuts — the plaintiff
will fail her case and the employer will walk away, free from liability,
despite their proven discrimination.
Circuits that offer an open choice between McDonnell Douglas and a
motiving factor framework may also confuse plaintiffs since they are not
clearly directed to choose either. Fogg v. Gonzales315 demonstrates how
this indecision can stymie lower courts.316 In the case, the defendant filed a
motion for judgment as a matter of law.317 In their motion, the defendant
mentioned pretext,318 though they did not want the trial court to use a
pretext framework.319 However, because of the mention of pretext, the
judge nonetheless applied McDonnell Douglas.320 What is particularly odd
in this case is that it is the plaintiffs who should choose which theory
applies, which even the opinion itself recognizes.321 To ameliorate this
confusion and potential backlogging of the judicial system, circuits should
analyze mixed-motive cases under only the motivating standard and not
offer McDonnell Douglas.
For these reasons, McDonnell Douglas should be removed entirely from
the mixed-motive analysis. This removal may be done through courts
relying more heavily on Desert Palace’s endorsement of the 2000e-2(m)
314. See id. at 720.
315. 492 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
316. See Thomas F. Kondro, Comment, Mixed Motives and Motivating Factors:
Choosing a Realistic Summary Judgment Framework for § 2000e-2(M) Of Title VII, 54 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1439, 1453 (2010).
317. See id.
318. See id. at 1454 (citing Fogg, 492 F.3d at 451).
319. See id.
320. See id. at 1453–54.
321. See Fogg, 492 F.3d at 451 (explaining that “[u]sing the mixed-motive theory, a
plaintiff can establish an unlawful employment practice” (emphasis added)).
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standard and essentially overruling how McDonnell Douglas contravened
Congress’s intent in enacting the 1991 CRA — which was making Title
VII more effective in the face of overly limiting precedent.
C. Legislative History Supports Including Implicit Bias and Excluding
McDonnell Douglas in Mixed-Motive Cases
Since its enactment, Title VII has expanded to encompass newly
recognized forms of discrimination. While Congress has, at times,
restricted Title VII,322 it has never overridden an expansive Supreme Court
interpretation — only ones that Congress did not see as expansive
enough.323 For example, in 1978, Congress amended Title VII to include
pregnancy discrimination as unlawful sex discrimination — overriding the
Court’s more restrictive views on such discrimination.324
The 1991 CRA House Report stated that “[i]f Title VII’s ban on
discrimination in employment is to be meaningful, proven victims of
intentional discrimination must be able to obtain relief, and perpetrators of
discrimination must be held liable for their actions.”325 Yet, as we have
seen, Title VII’s current interpretive state does not actually offer victims
effective relief, nor does it hold perpetrators liable. Due to their reluctance
to accept implicit bias evidence, judges may routinely dismiss meritorious
cases at summary judgment, leaving victims remediless. Even when the
stray case moves to trial, plaintiffs who choose the 2000e-2(m) method risk
losing any monetary recovery, while those opting for McDonnell Douglas
face steeper evidentiary standards ill-suited for mixed-motive cases.
Some may argue that Title VII never guaranteed monetary relief to
successful plaintiffs.326 However, declaratory and injunctive relief only
prevent future violations without addressing the employer’s past
misconduct’s effects on the plaintiff. Common types of injunctive relief,

322. When enacting Title VII, Congress included restrictive provisions as compromises
“in order to pass expanded prohibition against discrimination.” George Rutherglen, Title VII
as Precedent: Past and Prologue for Future Legislation, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 159, 160
(2014). Even the 1991 CRA contained restrictive provisions among its expansive ones. See
id. at 160 & n.9.
323. See id. at 173 (“In the 1991 Act . . . Congress only rejected restrictive interpretations
that cut back on the previous expansions of the law . . . . Where Congress has acted, it has
invariably expanded the law to the benefit of plaintiffs.”).
324. See Timeline of Important EEOC Events, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/youth/timeline-important-eeoc-events [https://perma.cc/JV9E-BLHR]
(last visited Mar. 3, 2022).
325. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 21 (1991) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 559.
326. See Kondro, supra note 316, at 1444 (“Even after the plaintiff established an
illegitimate motive, the Act blocked most forms of monetary relief to the plaintiff . . . .”).
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such as mandating an employer establish an antidiscrimination policy,327
may also fail to adequately remedy the aversive discrimination previously
described.328 This is not to say that all plaintiffs must be reinstated or
given backpay to be made whole; if offered, many plaintiffs may
reasonably refuse to be reinstated at a discriminatory workplace.329
However, Congress noted the importance of allowing private litigation
when it enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976
(Attorney’s Fees Act),330 which authorized fee-shifting in favor of
prevailing plaintiffs.331 Prior to the Act, courts used the “American rule,”
in which litigants typically bore their own fees and expenses incurred in
litigation regardless of their success on the merits.332 The Attorney’s Fees
Act was meant to incentivize private attorneys to litigate in favor of
plaintiffs alleging a variety of civil rights claims, including
discrimination.333 By assuring that attorneys would receive their fees, even
if their plaintiffs’ claims did not succeed, Congress hoped that private
attorneys would be more willing to take on such cases.334 Despite these
attempts to incentivize plaintiffs’ attorneys to litigate discrimination claims,
the current difficulty in establishing discrimination claims actively
dissuades private attorneys from taking on such cases.335 Introducing
implicit bias evidence not only modernizes the plaintiff’s evidentiary
burden, but plaintiffs’ attorneys, knowing they have a better shot of
establishing a successful claim with admissible implicit bias evidence, may

327. See, e.g., Eric M. Baum, Can I Get My Employer to Change Their Policies Through
My Discrimination Claim?, EISENBERG & BAUM LLP (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.eand
blaw.com/employment-discrimination-blog/2015/12/23/can-i-get-my-employer-to-changetheir-policies-through-my-discrimination-claim/ [https://perma.cc/LQX9-3NEY] (“In 2012,
for example, after a jury found manufacturing company AA Foundries, Inc. violated federal
law by subjecting African-American employees to a racially hostile work environment, the
court issued an order that . . . required the company to develop policies and procedures for
handling racial discrimination complaints in the future.”).
328. See supra notes 216–18 and accompanying text.
329. This may be due in part to the psychological injuries suffered because of
discrimination. The Supreme Court has allowed plaintiffs to refuse reinstatement under
these circumstances. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846
(2001).
330. Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641, 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)).
331. See Rutherglen, supra note 322, at 170.
332. See id.
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. See Selmi, supra note 232, at 570 (“For those attorneys who are in the pursuit of
profit, employment discrimination cases seem an especially poor choice to emphasize, since
the claims are exceedingly difficult to win and offer the potential for limited damages, two
factors that should suppress rather than encourage filings.”).
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incidentally fulfill the Attorney’s Fees Act’s goals by more willingly
litigating discrimination cases.
D. Including Implicit Bias Analysis in Mixed-Motive Cases Will Not
Overburden Employers’ Decision-Making Abilities
Employers may perceive courts’ analysis of implicit bias as improperly
restricting their decision-making abilities. Title VII discourse has long
been concerned about “thought control,” which argues that Title VII
sanctions employers “for having a biased individual in a position to hire or
fire, regardless of whether any of his decisions are influenced by his
beliefs.”336 Scholars against including implicit bias under 2000e-2(m)
point to the House Judiciary Committee’s statement that “[2000e-2(m)]
would not make mere discriminatory thoughts actionable.”337 Yet, when
acted upon, implicit bias is not “mere discriminatory thoughts.” As this
Note showed, implicit bias can influence workplace dynamics,
performance evaluations, hiring processes, and, ultimately, terminations.
This Note does not seek to penalize employers for having implicit bias. If
the data collected by Harvard is to be believed, almost everyone has some
form of implicit bias — even the LGBTQ* employees being discriminated
against.338 It is the acting upon it, subconsciously or otherwise, that should
be understood and remedied.
Employers may argue that there are no sufficient ways to prevent
implicit bias in the workplace beyond trainings, which have been shown to
be either insufficient in preventing bias or not financially feasible for most
employers.339 However, the first step toward addressing implicit bias is
acknowledging that it exists.340 By acknowledging implicit bias in their

336. Sullivan, supra note 25, at 376–77.
337. Matthew R. Scott & Russel D. Chapman, Much Ado About Nothing — Why Desert
Palace Neither Murdered McDonnell Douglas nor Transformed All Employment
Discrimination Cases to Mixed-Motive, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 395, 403 n.51 (2005) (citing
H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 (II), at 18 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549).
338. See Charlesworth & Banaji, supra note 177, at 182; see also Lex Konnelly, Both,
And: Transmedicalism and Resistance in Non-Binary Narratives of Gender-Affirming Care
3
(Toronto
Working
Papers
in
Linguistics,
Working
Paper,
2021)
(“[T]ransmedicalists . . . [are] those who . . . insist[] that deviating from the established
medical model undermines public acceptance of trans communities and trivializes
‘authentic’ trans experiences. They criticize those deemed ‘transtrenders,’ individuals who
‘inauthentically’ claim to be transgender in the absence of medicalized criteria, particularly
gender dysphoria.”).
339. See supra Section III.B.
340. See Eliminating Implicit Bias: First Step, Admit You Have It, AM. BAR. ASS’N (July
2017), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2017/july-2017/th
e-first-step-to-eliminating-implicit-bias—admit-you-have-it-/
[https://perma.cc/2HHKQUE4].
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employment discrimination analysis, the judiciary may spur employers to
conceive of better ways to manage implicit bias or, at the very least, have
them think twice about whether their employment decisions are truly biasfree.
Some legal scholars have argued that Bostock demonstrates that Title
VII already reaches non-explicit discrimination and, therefore, adding
implicit bias analysis is unnecessary.341 However, this argument relies on
discrimination that, while not explicitly stated, is still readily observable.
In all three cases consolidated in Bostock, the employees’ termination
occurred after their sexual orientation and gender identity were discovered
by the employer. It is not outlandish to assume that such termination is
“because of” sex. However, with more complicated cases, like that of
Kimble, Velez, and even Price Waterhouse, implicit bias is an essential
component of a fair assessment.
CONCLUSION
Despite the flaws in some courts’ enforcement of Title VII and the
mixed-motive standard, Bostock is still a historic precedent that should be
celebrated. In providing protections for sexual orientation and gender
identity, the Supreme Court furthered the U.S. values of fairness and
equality to a group deserving of them. Yet, its victory is an incomplete
one. Without changing how judges assess mixed-motive cases, LGBTQ*
plaintiffs may only have superficial protection from workplace
discrimination without the actual enforcement behind it. By removing
McDonnell Douglas from mixed-motive analysis and allowing for implicit
bias evidence under the 2000e-2(m) standard, Bostock can truly be as
momentous as the public sees it to be.

341. See Joan C. Williams, Rachel M. Korn & Sky Mihaylo, Beyond Implicit Bias:
Litigating Race and Gender Employment Discrimination Using Data from the Workplace
Experiences Survey, 72 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 404–06 (2020).

